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GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL2000 H STREET, N.W.WASHINGTON, DC  20052TEL: (202) 994-6386; FAX: (202) 994-9446EMAIL: AWILMARTH@LAW.GWU.EDUNovember 21, 2007                               United States Department of the TreasuryWashington, DC Re: Request for comments on “RegulatoryStructure Associated with FinancialInstitutions,” Docket No. TREAS-DO-2007-0018Thank you for the opportunity to submit these comments in connection with the TreasuryDepartment’s consideration of proposals for changes in the current structure of regulation forfinancial institutions.  My comments will focus on the regulation of depository institutionsinsured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).  At the end of each section of mycomments, I will present one or more specific policy recommendations based on the discussionin that section. The comments set forth below represent my personal opinions and do not represent theviews of The George Washington University or any other organization.A. Eliminating the Thrift Charter  For three reasons, the thrift charter should be abolished, and savings associations shouldbe required to convert into either national banks or state-chartered banks (at the option of eachconverting institution).  First, the powers and activities of thrift institutions and commercialbanks have become increasingly similar over the past 25 years.  Second, Congress combined thedeposit insurance funds for thrifts and banks in 2005.  Accordingly, there is no longer anycompelling reason for maintaining separate thrift and banking industries.  Second, despite their increasing convergence with commercial banks, thrift institutionsremain excessively dependent on housing finance.  As shown by the present crisis involvingsubprime and nonprime mortgage lending, any financial institution charter that focusessignificantly on home financing presents excessive risks to the federal safety net for financialinstitutions.  The current crisis is a reminder of what the nation should have learned from thesavings and loan debacle of the 1980s – the thrift industry’s business focus is too narrow todevelop a broad and reliable base for long-term profitability.  The current crisis has alreadyimposed severe losses on at least three of the largest thrift institutions – Countrywide,Washington Mutual and IndyMac.  The losses reported by those institutions reveal that even thelargest thrifts are vulnerable to severe downturns in the housing industry, an industry which hasrepeatedly experienced boom-and-bust cycles since the 1920s. 
1  For a discussion of the historical background and advantages of the dual bankingsystem, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’sAuthority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection,”23 Annual Review of Banking and Financial Law 225 (2004) (available athttp://ssrn.com/abstract= 577863) (hereinafter Wilmarth, “Dual Banking System”), at 253-65.
2  Id. at 262 (quoting the Bush Task Group Report on Regulation of Financial Services:Blueprint for Reform (1984)). 2
Accordingly, the thrift charter should be eliminated.  Concurrently, the supervisoryfunctions and staff of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) should be transferred to the Officeof the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).Policy Recommendation No. 1:  Abolish the thrift charter and merge the OTS withthe OCC.B. Preserving the Dual Banking System and Community BanksCongress has supported a dynamic and competitive dual banking system for more than a century.  The dual banking system has conferred three major benefits on the U.S. financialservices industry.  First, the states have acted as “laboratories” in experimenting with newbanking products, structures and supervisory approaches, and Congress has subsequentlyincorporated many of the states’ successful innovations into federal legislation.  Examples ofstate experiments adopted by Congress include:  checking accounts, bank branches, bank holdingcompanies, real estate loans, trust services, negotiable order of withdrawal accounts, depositinsurance, adjustable-rate mortgages, automated teller machines, interstate electronic fundstransfer systems, bank sales of insurance products, regional interstate banking compacts, andsupervisory agreements that ensure cooperative oversight of multistate banking organizations bystate bank regulators, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) and the FDIC.  No other banking systemin the world can match the dual banking system’s record of continuous innovation.1Second, by creating a choice between federal and state charters, the dual banking systemallows banks to escape from arbitrary or inflexible regulation.  It creates a dynamic rivalrybetween the national and state banking systems that encourages innovative and responsiveregulation.  In 1984, the Presidential Task Force on Regulation of Financial Services hailed the dual banking system as “one of the finest examples of cooperative federalism in thenation’s history.”  The Task Force praised the dual banking system because (i) it “provided asafety valve against out-dated or inflexible regulatory controls being imposed by either federal orstate authorities,” and (ii) it enabled the states to act as “laboratories for change.”2Third, the state banking system has acted as an incubator for smaller, community-oriented banks.  Over the past decade, more than three-quarters of newly-chartered (“de novo”)banks have chosen to operate under state charters.  State banking departments are moreaccessible to community banks and are more responsive to the views and needs of community
3  See Wilmarth, “Dual Banking System,” supra note 1, at 264-65, 274-79, 296-97, 353-56.
4  Id. at 263-65; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “The Transformation of the U.S.Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000; Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks,” 2002University of Illinois Law Review 215 (2002) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=315345)(hereinafter Wilmarth, “Transformation”), at 254-72. 
5  Canada has only about 70 banks, and the six largest banks dominate Canada’s domesticbanking markets.  C.J. Shaw, “Big Bank Merger Review in Canada,” 21 Journal of InternationalBanking Law and Regulation 474, 475 (2006); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “Too Big to Fail, TooFew to Serve? The Potential Risks of Nationwide Banks,” 77 Iowa Law Review 957 (1992)(hereinafter Wilmarth, “Too Big to Fail”), at 1052.  Similarly, the U.K. has fewer than 100banks, and the four largest banks dominate the U.K.’s domestic banking markets.  ShelaghHeffernan, “UK bank services for small business: How competitive is the market?”, 30 Journalof Banking and Finance 3087, 3089 (2006); Wilmarth, “Too Big to Fail,” supra, at 1052; seealso Glenn Hoggarth et al., “Alternative Routes to Banking Stability: A Comparison of UK andGerman Banking Systems,” Financial Stability Review, Bank of England, Autumn 1998, at 55,57 (reporting that the five largest U.K. banks accounted for 57% of the U.K.’s banking businessin 1994).  3
bankers.  In contrast, the OCC is primary focused on promoting the interests of large nationalbanks, which fund most of the OCC’s budget.3  The OCC’s bias in favor of larger banks isrevealed by its schedule for assessments, which imposes much higher marginal rates on smallnational banks.  For example, the OCC’s marginal assessment rate for national banks with assetsbetween $2 million and $100 million is (i) about twice as high as its marginal assessment rate forbanks with assets between $100 million and $1 billion, (ii) more than three times as high as itsmarginal assessment rate for banks with assets between $6 billion and $20 billion, and (iii) morethan six times as high as its marginal assessment rate for banks with assets of more than $40billion.  It is hardly surprising that the great majority of community banks select state charters. Accordingly, preservation of the state charter option is essential to preserve a vibrant communitybanking sector.The dual banking system in the United States is a decentralized, diverse systemcomposed of more than 7,000 banks, including thousands of community banks, scores ofmidsized regional banks, and a smaller group of large, multistate banking organizations. Community banks play a crucial role in providing credit and other financial services toconsumers and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).4  In contrast to the United States,Canada and the United Kingdom each have fewer than 100 banks.  The highly concentratedbanking systems of both nations are dominated by a handful of big banks.  As a result, very fewcommunity banks exist in Canada and the U.K.5  Due in large part to its thriving community
6  Wilmarth, “Dual Banking System,” supra note 1, at 263-65; Wilmarth, “Too Big toFail,” supra note 5, at 1038-40, 1052-55 (stating that “[t]he highly concentrated banking systemsin both countries have long been characterized by oligopolistic behavior,” id. at 1052); see alsoShaw, supra note 5, at 476 (noting that “[l]ike public utilities, the large [Canadian] banks areperceived to co-exist in a business environment which is (or very close to) oligopoly”).  Thelargest Canadian banks have received widespread public criticism for their high profits,excessive fees and poor service to consumers and SMEs.  See Gaétan Breton & Louise Côté,“Profit and the legitimacy of the Canadian banking industry,” 19 Accounting, Auditing &Accountability Journal 512, 521-31 (2006).  Two recent studies concluded that the “big four”U.K. banks displayed oligopolistic conduct in charging excessive prices for services to retailcustomers and SMEs.  See Heffernan, supra note 5; Shelagh A. Heffernan, “How do UKfinancial institutions really price their banking products?”, 26 Journal of Banking and Finance1997 (2002).  For additional reports criticizing major Canadian and U.K. banks, see sources citedin Wilmarth, “Dual Banking System,” supra note 1, at 264 n.146.
7  Wilmarth, “Transformation,” supra note 4, at 257-67.
8  Allen N. Berger et al., “Further Evidence on the Link between Finance and Growth: AnInternational Analysis of Community Banking and Economic Performance,” 25 Journal ofFinancial Services Research 169 (2004).
9  Kenneth D. Jones & Robert Oshinsky, “The Effect of Industry Consolidation andDeposit Insurance Reform on the Resiliency of the U.S. Bank Insurance Fund,” April 25, 2007(available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=997844), at 1.4
banking sector, the U.S. banking system has performed much better than the Canadian and U.K.systems in serving the needs of consumers and SMEs.6  By serving as the most important source of external credit for SMEs, community bankspromote economic growth in the United States.  SMEs account about half of the total privatesector output, employ a majority of the private sector workforce, and account for more than athird of all private sector innovations.7  A 2004 study confirms the link between communitybanks, the success of SMEs and economic growth.  Based on a review of banking systems in 49countries, that study found that countries recorded faster growth rates in their gross domesticprofit (GDP) if community banks accounted for a larger share of their banking system.  Thestudy concluded that the superior ability of community banks to provide relationship loans toSMEs was the most likely explanation for the observed correlation between community bankstrength and faster GDP growth.8    However, the survival of the community banking sector and its success in serving theneeds of retail customers and SMEs cannot be taken for granted.  During 1990-2005, more than5,400 bank mergers occurred in the United States, involving more than $5.0 trillion in bankingassets.  During the same period, the percentage of banking assets held by the ten largest U.S.banks rose from 25% to 55%.9  Extensive consolidation has occurred in many local, statewide
10  Wilmarth, “Transformation,” supra note 4, at 252-53, 293-96; see also Gerald A.Hanweck & Bernard Shull, “The bank merger movement: efficiency, stability and competitivepolicy concerns,” 44 Antitrust Bulletin 251, 252-57 (1999).
11  R. Alton Gilbert, “The Viability of Small Banks in the United States,” NetworksFinancial Policy Brief No. 2007-PB-07, April 2007 (available athttp://ssrn.com/abstract=985582). 
12  The same study also concluded that nonbank financial institutions did not provideenough credit to SMEs to make up for the reduced availability of bank credit in marketsdominated by big banks.  Steven G. Craig & Pauline Hardee, “The impact of bank consolidationon small business credit availability,” 31 Journal of Banking and Finance 1237 (2007).
13  See Wilmarth, “Dual Banking System,” supra note 1, at 227-29, 233-37, 280-87, 321-24. 5
and regional markets.10  This consolidation trend has called into question the long-term viabilityof community banks.  A recent study concluded that prospects for community banks with assetsbetween $100 million and $1 billion are generally favorable, but many community banks withassets under $100 million are unlikely to be long-term survivors.  That study also found that veryfew community banks were able to produce consistently high earnings in three geographicalregions – viz., New England, rural areas of the Middle Atlantic, and the Pacific Southwestcensus region.11  It is probably not a coincidence that (i) Bank of America dominates bankingmarkets in New England, and (ii) three major banks – Bank of America, U.S. Bank and WellsFargo – jointly dominate banking markets in the Pacific Southwest (an area that includesArizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico and Utah).       A decline in the presence of community banks in a local or regional market is likely todiminish the availability of credit to SMEs in that market.  A recent study found that SMEs weresignificantly less likely to obtain access to bank credit in urban or regional markets that weredominated by the largest banks.12  Accordingly, as discussed below in Section C, currentstatutory constraints on big bank mergers must be maintained and antitrust scrutiny of suchmergers should be intensified.  In addition, the state banking system must be maintained in orderto support existing community banks and encourage the formation of new community banks.  In sum, the dual banking system should be preserved and strengthened in view of itsoutstanding record of fostering innovation and economic growth.  To accomplish this goal, twosteps must be taken.  First, Congress must remove the competitive disparity that has been createdby the sweeping preemption rules adopted by the OCC.  Taking its cue from the OTS, the OCCadopted regulations in 2004 that effectively immunize national banks from state consumerprotection laws that apply to other financial institutions.13  As a consequence of the OCC’s rules,which Congress has never endorsed, national banks have secured a significant competitiveadvantage over state banks.  For example, the OCC’s rules encouraged several large, multistatebanks to convert from state to national charters during 2004-05.  Those conversions resulted in a
14  Id. at 274-81, 286-87; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “OCC v. Spitzer: An ErroneousApplication of Chevron That Should Be Reversed,” 86 BNA’s Banking Report 379 (Feb. 20,2006) (hereinafter Wilmarth, “OCC v. Spitzer”) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=886380),at 387; see also U.S. General Accountability Office, “OCC Preemption Rules: OCC ShouldFurther Clarify the Applicability of State Consumer Protection Laws to National Banks,” GAO-06-387, April 2006, at 6, 28-29, 65-70.
15  Wilmarth, “Dual Banking System,” supra note 1, at 254-57.
16  Id. at 265; see also Richard J. Rosen, “Is Three a Crowd? Competition AmongRegulators in Banking,” 35 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 969 (2003) (finding that theallocation of bank supervisory responsibilities among the FRB, FDIC and OCC improves theperformance of banks by allowing them to change their business strategies more easily, becauseeach bank can switch to a regulator that is more willing (and better suited) to approve andmonitor the bank’s chosen business strategy). 6
 significant shift in assets from the state banking system to the national banking system.  Theshare of banking assets held by the state system, which had been stable since the mid-1970s,declined from 44% in 2003 to 33% in 2005.  Unless Congress reestablishes a basic paritybetween the competitive opportunities of national and state banks, it is doubtful whether the dualbanking system can survive over the longer term.14  As described below in Part D, Congress can restore competitive parity by adoptinguniform consumer protection legislation that applies equally to all financial service providers. The enactment of uniform consumer protection legislation would be similar to past legislation inwhich Congress has ensured that state banks enjoy parity with national banks in important areassuch as intrastate and interstate branching, trust powers, usury, charter conversions, and financialsubsidiaries.15 Second, federal supervision of state banks by at least one agency that is separate andindependent of the OCC must be maintained.  The supervisory responsibilities of the FRB andFDIC over state banks have encouraged those agencies to compete with the OCC in providinginnovative and responsive regulation.  Supervision of state-chartered banks by the FRB and theFDIC has thus reinforced the competitive dynamic created by the dual banking system.16  Inview of the FRB’s primary responsibility for regulating financial holding companies andcontrolling systemic risk – discussed below in Section E – Congress might decide that it is nolonger desirable for the FRB to have direct supervisory authority over state banks.  In that case,the separate category of state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System could beeliminated, and the FDIC could be designated as the primary federal regulator for all FDIC-insured state banks.Policy Recommentation No. 2:  The dual banking system should be preserved andstrengthened in order to promote innovation in banking regulation and to support thecommunity bank sector as a crucial engine for economic growth.   
17  Jones & Oshinsky, supra note 9, at 1.
18  See Hanweck & Shull, supra note 10, at 265-73 (citing studies); Wilmarth,“Transformartion,” supra note 4, at 293-95 (same); Wilmarth, “Too Big to Fail,” supra note 5, at1020-23 (same).
19  See Hanweck & Shull, supra note 10, at 273-79 (citing studies); Wilmarth,“Transformation,” supra note 4, at 295-96 (same); Timothy H. Hannan, “Retail deposit fees andmultimarket banking,” 30 Journal of Banking & Finance 2561 (2006); Timothy H. Hannan &Robin A. Prager, “The competitive implications of multimarket bank branching,” 28 Journal ofBanking & Finance 1889 (2004); Charles W. Calomiris & Thanavut Pornrojnangkool,“Monopoly-Creating Bank Consolidation? The Merger of Fleet and BankBoston,” NationalBureau of Economic Research Working Paper 11351, May 2005 (available athttp://www.nber.org/papers/w11351). 
20  Edward J. Kane, “Incentives for Banking Megamergers: What Motives MightRegulators Infer from Event-Study Evidence?”, 32 Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 671,673-74, 689-95 (2000); Wilmarth, “Transformation,” supra note 4, at 300-312.7
Policy Recommendation No. 3:  At least one federal agency that is independent andseparate from the OCC should be designated as the primary federal regulator for state-chartered banks.C. Maintaining and Strengthening Limits on Bank Mega-MergersAs discussed above in Part B, the U.S. banking industry has experienced extensiveconsolidation over the past two decades.  During 1990-2005, more than 5,400 bank mergersoccurred, including 74 “mega-mergers” in which the buyer and seller each had more than $10billion of assets.  As a result of these mergers, the percentage of banking assets and deposits heldby the ten largest banks more than doubled, rising from 25% and 17%, respectively, to 55% and45%, respectively.17    The consolidation trend presents four significant potential threats to the welfare of thebanking industry and the broader economy.  First, large bank mergers can produce excessivelevels of market power, leading to diminished competition among banks.  Studies have shownthat banks in highly concentrated local banking markets are likely to charge higher interest ratesand fees for lending and deposit services, and to pay lower interest rates on their deposits.18 Similarly, studies have found that large, multistate banks with significant market shares inregional banking markets typically charge higher prices for their financial services.19  Second, “mega-mergers” create “megabanks” that are “too big to fail” (TBTF) and,frequently, “too big to discipline adequately” (TBTDA).20  Megabanks enjoy major advantagesby virtue of their TBTF and TBTDA status.  Compared with smaller banks, megabanks are ableto (i) pay significantly lower rates on their deposits, (ii) operate with significantly higher
21  See, e.g., Gary H. Stern & Ron J. Feldman, Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of BankBailouts 30-40 (2004); William C. Handorf & Lili Zhu, “US Bank Loan-Loss Provisions,Economic Conditions, and Regulatory Guidance,” 16 Journal of Applied Finance 97, 110-12(2006); Hanweck & Shull, supra note 10, at 273-77; Maria F. Penas & Haluk Unal, “Gains inbank mergers; Evidence from the bond markets,” 74 Journal of Financial Economics 149(2004); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and Commerce,” 39Connecticut Law Review 1539 (2007) (hereinafter Wilmarth, “Banking and Commerce”)(available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=984103), at 1590-92 (including studies cited therein).
22  See Stern & Feldman, supra note 21, at 32-33, 60-79; Hanweck & Shull, supra note10, at 273-77; Kane, supra note 20, at 673-74, 690-95.
23  Elijah Brewer III & Julapa A. Jagtiani, “How Much Would Banks Be Willing to Payto Become “Too-Big-to-Fail and to Capture Other Benefits?”, July 2007 (available athttp://ssrn.com/abstract=1003163), at 17-26.
24  Jones & Oshinsky, supra note 9.
25  See Wilmarth, “Transformation,” supra note 4, at 312-16, 444-45, and sources citedtherein. 8
leverage (i.e., lower capital ratios), (iii) hold significantly lower loan-loss reserves in relation totheir credit risks, and (iv) secure higher credit ratings and pay significantly lower interest rateson their bonds.21  The large subsidy enjoyed by TBTF institutions has been a major motivatingfactor behind the “mega-mergers” that have occurred in the U.S. banking industry during thepast two decades.22  A recent study examined mergers in which the acquiring bank attainedpresumptive TBTF status by either (i) exceeding $100 billion in total assets or $20 billion inmarket value of equity, or (ii) becoming one of the eleven largest banks.  The study found that,on average, the acquiring bank paid an excess premium of more than $1 billion to the target bankin order to achieve presumptive TBTF status.23Third, mega-banks present growing risks to the solvency of the FDIC’s deposit insurancefund.  A study by FDIC staff economists concluded that (i) consolidation in the banking industryhas significantly increased the risk that the deposit insurance fund will become insolvent, and (ii)the failure of any of the ten largest banks would present a grave threat to the solvency of thefund.24  Fourth, due in large part to the existence of TBTF subsidies, consolidation has resulted inan intensification of risk within the financial services industry.  During the banking crisis of the1980s and early 1990s, large banks engaged in the most risky lending strategies.  Eleven of thenation’s fifty largest banks failed during 1980-92.  Large banks failed at a higher rate thansmaller banks during 1981-91, and large bank failures accounted for a majority of the lossessuffered by the FDIC’s bank insurance fund during 1986-94.25  
26  My previous articles have emphasized the connection between TBTF/TBTDA statusand excessive risk-taking, as well as the inadequacy of current regulatory approaches to controlsuch risk-taking by megabanks and other large financial conglomerates.  See Wilmarth,“Transformation,” supra note 4, at 444-76; Wilmarth, “Banking and Commerce,” supra note 21,at 1588-93, 1616-21.
27  See Bernard Shull & Gerald A. Hanweck, “Bank Merger Policy: Proposals forChange,” 114 Banking Law Journal 214, 225-31 (2002).9
Currently, as discussed below in Part E, the U.S. financial services industry confronts itsmost serious crisis since the early 1990s.  Once again, the greatest risks are concentrated in thelargest depository institutions.  Citigroup, Bank of America, Wachovia, Washington Mutual andCountrywide have all reported serious losses, as have three large foreign banks with extensiveU.S. operations (HSBC, UBS and Barclays) and two large securities firms that control FDIC-insured thrifts and industrial banks (Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley).  The current crisisshould establish beyond any doubt that TBTF subsidies encourage the largest financialinstitutions to pursue excessively risky business strategies.26For all of the above reasons, Congress should maintain existing statutory limits on bankmega-mergers, including those which (i) prohibit any interstate bank merger or any interstateacquisition of a bank by a bank holding company that would give the acquiring institutioncontrol of more than 10% of the total amount of deposits held by all insured depositoryinstitutions in the United States (the “10% nationwide deposit cap”), and (ii) prohibit any suchmerger or acquisition if it would give the acquiring institution control of more than 30% of thetotal amount of deposits held by all insured depository institutions in a single state, unless thatpercentage is increased by that state’s law (the “30% statewide deposit cap”).  See 12 U.S.C.1831u(b)(2) & 1842(d)(2).  In addition, Congress should require intensified scrutiny and specialconditions for any bank merger or acquisition in which the acquiring institution would gaincontrol of more than 2% of nationwide deposits or more than 20% of statewide deposits in anystate.  For example, heightened requirements for such mergers could include (i) a more intensiveanalysis of all relevant competitive factors, (ii) increased attention to the question of whether themerger under review would produce net benefits to consumers and other members of the public,including benefits that would accrue to each of the urban and regional markets affected by themerger, and (iii) a requirement that megabanks – i.e., those controlling more than 2% ofnationwide deposits – must maintain higher capital ratios and pay higher deposit insurancepremiums to the FDIC.27     Policy Recommendation No. 4:  Maintain the existing statutory limits on bankmergers and acquisitions, including the 10% nationwide deposit cap and the 30%statewide deposit cap.Policy Recommendation No. 5:  Require intensified scrutiny and special conditionsfor any merger or acquisition in which the acquiring institution would gain control of morethan 2% of nationwide deposits or more than 20% of statewide deposits in any state. 
28  See Wilmarth, “Dual Banking System,” supra note 1, at 227-29, 233-37, 274-93, 306,324-27, 347 n.506.
29  See id. at 228-29; Wilmarth, “OCC v. Spitzer,” supra note 14.
30  See Wilmarth, “Dual Banking System,” supra note 1, at 306-08.10
D. Providing More Effective Protection to Consumers of Financial ServicesAs discussed in Part B, the OCC and OTS have adopted regulations that preempt theapplication of state consumer protection laws to national banks and federally-chartered thrifts ortheir operating subsidiaries.  In particular, the OCC and OTS rules targeted state laws thatattempted to protect consumers against predatory or deceptive lending practices with respect tohome mortgages and credit cards.28  The OCC also adopted a regulation designed to preempt thestates’ authority to enforce applicable state laws against national banks.29  The OCC and OTS rules effectively prevented the states from enforcing their predatorylending laws against federally-chartered depository institutions or their operating subsidiaries. The OCC’s rules also provided national banks with a significant competitive advantage overstate banks, as shown in Part C.  In addition, the OCC’s rules have allowed national banks toimpose record levels of penalty interest rates, late payment fees, over-the-limit charges, andother charges and fees on credit card holders.  In contrast to their aggressive preemption efforts, the OCC and OTS failed to provide anymeaningful protection for consumers that would replace the state laws they preempted.  Untilrecently, the OCC’s rules contained only one mandatory regulation with regard to predatorylending.  That regulation  provided in general terms that national banks could not make realestate loans based “predominantly” on the value of the borrower’s collateral and withoutconsidering the borrower’s ability to repay the loan.30  However, until June 2007, the OCC andOTS allowed their regulated institutions to make subprime 2/28 and 3/27 loans based solely onthe borrower’s ability to pay the introductory “teaser” rate and without taking account of theborrower’s ability to pay the fully amortized rate.  In addition, the OCC and OTS did notprohibit their regulated institutions from imposing heavy prepayment penalties that made itextremely costly for subprime borrowers to refinance 2/28 or 3/27 loans. These types of abusivesubprime loans have experienced the worst delinquency and default rates during the past year. In addition, the origination, funding and securitization of such loans have inflicted severe losseson several major national banks (including Citigroup, Wachovia, HSBC and UBS), as well asCountrywide (which held a national bank charter until the end of 2006, and a federal thriftcharter since that time), and two major federally-charterd thrifts (Washington Mutual andIndyMac).  To date, no large state-chartered bank has reported comparable losses.Congress should adopt comprehensive legislation that establishes uniform consumerprotection standards for all home mortgage lenders, credit card lenders, and other providers ofconsumer credit.  Such legislation should remove the competitive disparity created by the OCC’s
31  If my Policy Recommendation No. 1 is adopted, the thrift charter and the OTS woulddisappear and it would not be necessary for Congress to overrule the OTS’ preemptiveregulations.
32  See Wilmarth, “Dual Banking System,” supra note 1, at 274-79, 296-97, 353-56;Wilmarth, “OCC v. Spitzer,” supra note 14, at 387.
33  Wilmarth, “Dual Banking System,” supra note 1, at 316, 348-52.11
preemption rules by ensuring that national banks and state banks must observe the same federalstandards of consumer protection.  The House recently passed legislation on mortgage lending(H.R. 3915) that would represent an important first step toward achieving this goal.    For two reasons, such legislation should prohibit the OCC from issuing regulations thatpreempt state laws except in specific areas where Congress has given the OCC explicit authorityto adopt preemptive rules.31  First, the OCC’s 2004 preemption rules were adopted withoutexpress congressional authorization and undermined the dual banking system by conferring anunwarranted competitive advantage on national banks.  Second, the OCC’s regulatory approachhas proven to be deeply flawed.  The OCC (like the OTS) failed to protect its regulatedinstitutions, their customers and the financial system from severe and potentially crippling lossesresulting from unsound lending and securitization activities.In addition, the legislation should establish a separate and independent federal authoritythat would be responsible for enforcing federal consumer protection laws against all financialservice providers, including national banks and their operating subsidiaries.  This new federalauthority (which I will call the “Financial Services Consumer Protection Authority” or“FSCPA”) could be a separate bureau of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or a newindependent agency.  The FSCPA should be funded by congressional appropriations – not byassessments on financial institutions – in order to assure the FSCPA’s independence from thefinancial services industry.  The OCC has failed to provide effective enforcement of consumerprotection laws, particularly with regard to the largest national banks.  The OCC’s financialincentives provide the most plausible explanation for its poor enforcement record.  The OCC isunderstandably reluctant to take vigorous enforcement measures against its biggest regulatedconstituents, because those banks fund most of the OCC’s budget.32  If the FSCPA is funded bytaxpayer revenues, it should feel a greater responsibility to protect the public from unlawful orabusive financial practices.Finally, Congress should recognize the authority of state attorneys general to enforceapplicable state consumer protection laws – including laws prohibiting unfair and deceptivepractices (UDAP laws) – against all financial service providers, including national banks andtheir operating subsidiaries.  The operations of state attorneys general are funded by taxes paidby citizens, and they are politically accountable to those citizens.  It is therefore not surprisingthat state attorneys general have played an essential role in protecting consumers from unlawfulpractices committed by both state-chartered and federally-chartered financial institutions.33  In
12
order to ensure coordination between the FSCPA and state attorneys general, Congress couldrequire a state attorney to give prior notice to the FSCPA, and to allow the FSPCA to takeappropriate action, before the state attorney general could initiate a formal proceeding against anational bank to enforce a state consumer protection law. Policy Recommendation No. 6:  Congress should adopt comprehensive legislationthat establishes uniform consumer protection standards for all home mortgage lenders,credit card lenders, and other providers of consumer credit.Policy Recommendation No. 7:  Congress should prohibit the OCC from issuing regulations that preempt state law except in specific areas where Congress has given theOCC explicit authority to adopt preemptive rules.Policy Recommendation No. 8:  Congress should establish a separate andindependent authority to enforce federal consumer protection laws against all financialservice providers, including national banks.  This new authority should be funded bycongressional appropriations in order to ensure its independence from the financialservices industry.Policy Recommendation No. 9:  Congress should authorize state attorneys generalto enforce applicable state consumer protection laws against all financial service providers,including national banks.        E. Controlling Systemic Risk1. The Current Financial CrisisIn recent weeks, leading commercial banks and Wall Street firms have reported morethan $40 billion of losses resulting from originating, funding and securitizing subprime andnonprime mortgage loans, and from issuing credit enhancements and derivatives related to thoseloans.  The CEOs of Citigroup and Merrill Lynch have been forced to resign.  Some analystshave predicted that major banks and Wall Street firms will ultimately incur losses of more than$200 billion from the subprime lending debacle.  Many analysts and bank executives have admitted that they cannot reliably estimate thefull extent of losses that financial institutions may ultimately suffer from the subprime disaster. The opaque instruments and complex off-balance-sheet structures created by large financialconglomerates make it impossible to measure the risks these institutions have assumed.Meanwhile, our nation is experiencing a wave of defaults and delinquencies onresidential mortgage loans.  Our housing industry has been shattered, and many communitieshave been devastated by declining home values and widespread foreclosures.  Not surprisingly,the public has lost confidence in the integrity of our financial institutions and markets.     In defending their past oversight of subprime lending and securitization activities, federal
34  See Wilmarth, Banking and Commerce, supra note 21, at 1589-90 (stating that“[d]uring a systemic crisis, the safety net subsidy is likely to become very large because thefederal government, in effect, provides ‘catastrophe insurance.’ . . . The existence of a subsidyfor TBTF institutions is further indicated by the fact that no major U.S. bank has eversurrendered its bank charter and chosen to operate as a nonbank”). 13
regulators have claimed that “market discipline” can be relied upon to restrain the behavior offinancial institutions.  However, market discipline is clearly ineffective with respect to the TBTFconglomerates that now dominate our financial system.  During the current crisis, regulatorshave felt compelled to support major financial institutions whenever they were threatened byadverse market conditions.  When the financial markets cut off financing for Countrywide andother major financial institutions last summer, the FRB and the Federal Home Loan Bank(FHLB) System provided massive liquidity assistance.  The Fed also allowed six leading banks(Citigroup, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Deutsche Bank, Barclays and Royal Bank ofScotland) to extend credit to their securities affiliates for a “temporary” period  without regard tothe restrictions on affiliate transactions imposed by Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act.  Similarly, the Treasury Department has publicly and actively supported the creation of anindustry-funded “master liquidity enhancement conduit” designed to relieve the pressure onCitigroup and other big banks that are plagued by large exposures to asset-backed commercialpaper held by “structured investment vehicles” (SIVs).  In contrast to the support provided to TBTF conglomerates, federal regulators took noaction to prevent the failure of dozens of smaller nondepository institutions as well as two smallbanks (Netbank and Miami Valley Bank).  Thus, the current crisis reveals in vivid terms thereality and magnitude of TBTF subsidies for major financial conglomerates.34   There are many questions that must be answered in resolving the current crisis in ourfinancial services industry.  For example, why were federal regulators apparently so reluctant toquestion the assumptions underlying (i) the “internal risk models” that big commercial andinvestment banks followed in their subprime lending and securitization programs, and (ii) theexternal credit ratings that those institutions obtained from credit ratings agencies?  Why didregulators wait until June 2007 to instruct banks that they must underwrite 2/28 and 3/27 loans atthe fully amortized rate rather than the teaser rate?  Why weren’t regulators concerned about theadverse impact of prepayment penalties and other fees imposed on subprime borrowers?  Whydidn’t regulators recognize the credit and reputational risks that major banks and thrifts(including those controlled by securities firms) were assuming under their subprime lending andsecuritization programs?  Why didn’t regulators know about the liquidity puts and other creditenhancements that major banks reportedly provided to off-balance-sheet SIVs and otherpurchasers of asset-backed securities?  Why didn’t regulators question the reasonableness andobjectivity of credit ratings that routinely assigned “AAA” ratings to 80% of the tranches insecurities backed entirely by high-risk subprime mortgages – especially when the ratingsagencies negotiated their ratings and were paid large fees by the banks that issued thosesecurities?  
35  For a similar proposal, see Henry Kaufman, “Who’s Watching the Big Banks?,” WallStreet Journal, Nov. 13, 2007, at A25 (advocating the creation of a “Federal Financial OversightAuthority,” which would “function under the auspices of the Federal Reserve” and wouldsupervise the 10-20 largest financial conglomerates).14
The current crisis raises additional troubling questions in light of recent experience withfinancial abuses and excesses.  Many of the big banks and Wall Street firms that played keyroles in the subprime lending and securitization debacle also were underwriters for the securitiesthat produced a similar boom-and-bust cycle in the dotcom and telecom industries in the late1990s.  Many of the same institutions were also tarnished by scandals involving Enron,WorldCom, biased investment analysts, manipulative practices in initial public offerings, andtrading abuses in mutual funds.  Why weren’t these institutions subject to increased regulatoryscrutiny in light of their recent mistakes and misconduct?The bursting of the dotcom and telecom bubble destroyed $8 trillion of investment valueduring 2000-02.  The housing bust is expected to destroy at least $2 trillion of market value inour housing stock, in addition to the losses it will inflict on financial institutions.  Twodevastating bubbles and busts in less than a decade demonstrates that our financial regulatorysystem is deeply flawed.  “Market discipline” can no longer be relied upon as the primary arbiterof financial industry practices. 2. Needed Reforms to Control Systemic RiskThe policy recommendations listed in Part D address some of the regulatory flawsrevealed by the subprime crisis.  Many of the questions listed in Part E(1) highlight the need fora new regulatory approach that emphasizes vigorous financial supervision and effectiveprotection of consumers.  In my remaining comments, I wish to focus on structural reforms thatare needed to improve our ability to control systemic risk.Congress should designate the FRB as the agency having primary authority forcontrolling systemic risk in the financial markets.  To accomplish this goal, all “significant”financial institution holding companies – i.e., those with more than a specified amount ofconsolidated assets (e.g., $200 billion, as adjusted for inflation) – should be required to registerwith the FRB as financial holding companies under 12 U.S.C. 1843(k) if they control an FDIC-insured bank.  Thus, all bank holding companies, securities firms and insurance companieswould be required to register as financial holding companies, and would become subject to theFRB’s oversight, if they meet the consolidated asset test for “significance.”35  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) established the FRB as the “umbrella regulator”for financial holding companies with the clear intention that the FRB has primary responsibilityfor ensuring the overall safety and soundness of financial holding companies and controllingsystemic risk.  Unfortunately, GLBA’s design was not completely implemented, because it didnot require all large financial conglomerates that control FDIC-insured depository institutions tobecome financial holding companies.  Thrift holding companies and holding companies that
36  In Wilmarth, “Banking and Commerce,” supra note 14, I have argued that Congressshould prohibit any further acquisitions of FDIC-insured ILCs by commercial firms.  With theexception of 15 ILCs that are currently owned by commercial firms, all corporate owners ofFDIC-insured industrial banks are financial firms that could satisfy the criteria for financialholding companies under 12 U.S.C. 1843(k).  If it wished, Congress could “grandfather” thecommercial owners of those 15 ILCs and could exempt them from FRB oversight, withappropriate safeguards to ensure that the commercial owners could not become a source ofsystemic risk within the financial markets. 15
control industrial loan companies (ILCs) were exempted from the FRB’s oversight.  The severe problems encountered by Countrywide, Washington Mutual, IndyMac,Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley demonstrate that neither the OTS nor the SEC can adequatelyperform the role of systemic risk regulator for large financial conglomerates that control FDIC-insured depository institutions.  Countrywide has shown that a financial conglomerate facing aliquidity crisis in the financial markets can rapidly shift its operations to its depository institutionsubsidiary, which can then raise funds by soliciting FDIC-insured deposits and seeking advancesfrom the FRB and/or the FHLB System.  Thus, a financial conglomerate can quickly expand itsFDIC-insured subsidiary for the specific purpose of maximizing the federal safety net subsidiesavailable to that institution. My Policy Recommendation No. 1 would require all thrift institutions to convert to bankcharters and would eliminate the OTS, thereby ending the OTS’ role as a holding companysupervisor.  The SEC is not designed or equipped to serve as a systemic risk supervisor for largefinancial conglomerates.  FDIC-insured ILCs have powers equivalent to commercial banks, except for the ability to accept demand deposits from for-profit businesses.  Accordingly,Congress should remove the exemption for ILCs from the Bank Holding Company Act, at leastwith respect to any corporate owner of an ILC that would satisfy the “significance” testdescribed above (e.g., Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley).36  The FRB is the only agency with the necessary expertise and powers to act as “systemicrisk regulator.”  The FRB is the lender of last resort (LOLR) and must therefore play a key rolein preventing the collapse of a major financial institution that could trigger systemic risk withinthe financial markets and the broader economy.  The recent Northern Rock episode in the UnitedKingdom demonstrates the mistake of separating the LOLR function from concurrentresponsibility for regulating financial institutions to prevent systemic risk.  The U.K. FinancialServices Authority (FSA) had authority to regulate Northern Rock but could not act as LOLR. The Bank of England had authority to act as LOLR but could not regulate Northern Rock.  Therewas an apparent breakdown in communications between the FSA and the Bank of England dueto this division of responsibilities.  As a result, the Bank of England reportedly did not appreciatethe need for liquidity assistance and the potential systemic impact of a failure at Northern Rockuntil depositors began to run on the institution.  The U.K. Treasury felt compelled to announce ablanket guarantee of all deposits in order to stop the run, and the Bank of England provided
37  See, e.g., “Briefing: Northern Rock: Lessons of the fall,” Economist, Oct. 20, 2007, at91; Kate Burgess et al., “Week that shook the banking world,” Financial Times, Sept. 22, 2007,at 3. 16
advances to Northern Rock that currently exceed $50 billion.37  Congress could designate the FRB as the systemic risk regulator for all “significant”financial conglomerates without disturbing GLBA’s existing scheme of functional regulation. Federal bank regulators, the SEC and state insurance regulators could continue to carry out theirexisting roles as functional supervisors within GLBA’s framework.  However, Congress shouldgive the FRB sufficient authority so that it can (i) monitor the aggregate risks created by“significant” financial holding companies and (ii) take all necessary steps to prevent thosecompanies from engaging in practices that have the potential to create systemic risk.As a further step toward controlling systemic risk, Congress should reduce the scope ofprotection provided by the FDIC’s deposit insurance fund (DIF).  Congress should mandate thatthe DIF can only be used to protect holders of insured deposits.  The DIF should be prohibitedfrom making any payments to uninsured depositors or other uninsured bank creditors.  Congressshould repeal the “systemic risk” exception in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C.1823(c)(4)(G), which allows the FDIC to protect uninsured depositors and other creditors inTBTF banks.  All responsibility for protecting creditors of TBTF institutions should be assignedto the FRB under its authority as LOLR and systemic risk regulator.  In addition, Congressshould require the FRB to impose assessments on “significant” financial holding companies inorder to recover the FRB’s cost of providing financial assistance to any such company.  Thesereforms would (i) focus the FDIC on its primary mission of protecting insured depositors, (ii)remove the DIF and smaller banks as potential funding sources for rescues of TBTF banks, (iii)require TBTF financial conglomerates to internalize the cost of safety net subsidies provided tosimilar organizations, and (iv) encourage TBTF conglomerates to monitor more closely the risksassumed by their peers, in view of their contingent liability for TBTF rescues. Policy Recommendation No. 10:  Congress should designate the FRB as the systemicrisk regulator for each “significant” financial conglomerate that controls an FDIC-insuredbank.  Each such conglomerate should be required to register as a financial holdingcompany and to become subject to the FRB’s oversight.Policy Recommendation No. 11:  Congress should prohibit the FDIC’s depositinsurance fund from making any payments to uninsured depositors or other uninsuredbank creditors.  Congress should repeal the “systemic risk” exemption in the FederalDeposit Insurance Act.  Policy Recommendation No. 12:  All responsibility for protecting creditors of “toobig to fail” financial institutions should be assigned to the FRB under its authority aslender of last resort and systemic risk regulator.  Congress should require the FRB toimpose assessments on “significant” financial holding companies in order to recover the
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FRB’s cost of providing financial assistance to any such company.    *************************************************
Thank you for your kind consideration of the foregoing comments.Very truly yours,Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.Professor of LawThe George Washington University Law School
  
 
